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Constitutional Law-TERMINATION OF UTILITY SERVICES FOR NON-PAYMENT
OF BILL WITHOUT A HEARING DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 95 S. Ct.
449 (1974).
Present governmental regulation of public utilities can be traced back
to early English common law which imposed duties and obligations upon
those who performed vital public services.1 Two theories justified the impo-
sition of these controls. The first focused on the monopoly status of the
regulated business,2 while the second relied on the "public calling" aspect
of the enterprise.' Today under the judicial power4 almost every state has
a public utility commission which imposes a wide range of controls over
the production and delivery of utility services. This can have far-reaching
consequences because the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment5 requires that states, or entities acting under color of state law, give
reasonable notice and an impartial hearing prior to the termination of
privileges, services, entitlements, benefits, or rights.6
Several federal cases have considered whether the. fourteenth amend-
ment requires that utility service customers be afforded the protection of
procedural due process before a privately owned company may discontinue
services for non-payment of bills.7 In each case the plaintiffs brought suit
1. Barnes, Government Regulation of Public Service Corporations, 3 MAnQ. L. REV. 65, 67
(1919). See generally M. GLAESER, PUBLIC UTnxTES IN AMERICAN CAPrALISM 196 (1957); B.
WYMAN, PUBuC SERVICE CORPORATIONS 3-16 (1911).
2. Out of medieval England and the de facto monopolies held by small groups of business-
men and professionals, evolved the notion of "natural monopolies." Natural monopolies were
those businesses which, by their very nature, did not admit free competition and consequently
under common law, would be subject to regulation and control. See authorities cited note 1
supra.
3. B. WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CoRPORATIONS 3-16 (1911). Businesses that controlled vital
resources or supplied services and goods needed by all members of society were held to be
engaged in "public callings."
4. Attorney Gen. v. Railroad Co., 35 Wis. 425, 530-33 (1874).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
6. 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 317 (1972).
7. For cases holding that public utility termination procedures are subject to the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d
566 (8th Cir.), vacated as moot, 409 U.S. 815 (1972); Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F.
Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Bronson v. Consolidated Edison Co., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Hattel v. Public Serv. Co., 350 F. Supp. 240 (D. Colo. 1972); Stanford v. Gas Serv.
Co., 346 F. Supp. 717 (D. Kan. 1972). Contra, Lucas v. Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 466 F.2d
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,8 which requires proof that: the defendant acted
"under color of" state law;' and the plaintiff was deprived of a right guar-
anteed by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.,' The pivotal
issue in these cases has been the requirement that the deprivation be
carried out "under color of" state law."
638 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973); Martin v. Pacific Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 441 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971); Kadlec v. Illinois Bell
Tel. Co., 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
For a general history of section 1983 see Poole, Statutory Remedies for the Protection of
Civil Rights, 32 ORE. L. REv. 210 (1953).
9. Although the language of § 1983, "under color of" law, appears to be broader than the
language of the fourteenth amendment, which refers only to state action, the Supreme Court
has held that it is the same as state action under the fourteenth amendment. See United
States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966). See also Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
10. While utility service might not be considered property in the conventional sense, the
Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970), recognized a new form of
property called "entitlements." An entitlement is a judicially determined property right
arising from the relationship of the state and an individual which is created when a state
confers a particular status on an individual. Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Issues
in Public Utility Consumer Law, 24 U. FLA. L. Rav. 744, 747 (1972). For a discussion of status
as a property right see Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
The Goldberg rationale holds that once the state has undertaken to provide a service or
extend a benefit to an individual, it must comply with the due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment before such service or benefit can be terminated. The states require
utility companies to obtain licenses before they can furnish services to the public; state
statutes require utilities to serve all who apply for such services, and evince a strong interest
in assuring that utility services are fairly provided. Therefore, it can be strongly argued that
the state has conferred a benefit upon the public, the denial of which requires due process of
law.
Things that have been held to be entitlements include: Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)
(driver's license); California Dept. of Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1971) (unem-
ployment compensation); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (welfare benefits); Thorpe
v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (public housing).
11. The Supreme Court has persistently refused to formulate a precise definition of state
action. Instead, it has said: "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the non-
obvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance."
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961). The plaintiffs in the utility
cases (see note 8 supra) have argued the presence of state action under the following four
theories:
1. Utilities are subject to state regulation. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451 (1952); American Communication As'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Steele
v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
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In the recent case of Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,12 the United
States Supreme Court dealt squarely with this issue. 3 Mrs. Catherine
Jackson brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Metropolitan Edison
Company,' a privately owned and operated Pennsylvania corporation,
when they terminated her electric service for non-payment of an overdue
bill without giving her a hearing and an opportunity to pay any amounts
found due. Mrs. Jackson argued that Metropolitan Edison was acting
under color of state law'1 and that its termination process deprived her of
her property without due process of law.'" The District Court for the Mid-
dle District of Pennsylvania dismissed the complaint upon the grounds
2. Utilities perform a "public function." Amalgamated Food Employees Union 590
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966);
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
3. Utility companies are agents of or joint participants with the state. Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-25 (1961); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
15-16 (1958); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S.
73, 88-89 (1932).
4. The three previous theories are not distinct, but are meant to be applied together.
Examining each theory individually might not support a finding of state action, but
when applied cumulatively to public utilities there emerges a distinct pattern of state
involvement. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722-26 (1961).
For a more detailed discussion of these theories, see Comment, Constitutional Safeguards
for Public Utility Customers: Power To The People, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 493, 500-11 (1973).
12. 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Jackson].
13. It must be remembered that interpretation of the state action requirement has been
chiefly at issue in cases concerned with acts of racial discrimination, where the Court will
look closely before dismissing a complaint alleging racial discrimination for lack of state
action. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715 (1961).
14. Metropolitan Edison Company holds a certificate of public convenience issued by the
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission. As a condition of holding its certificate it is
subject to extensive regulation by the State Utilities Commission which has broad power over
utility rates, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 66, § 1141 et seq. (1959), over the character and quality of
utility services and facilities, id. §§ 1171, 1182-83, and broad power to regulate and investigate
complaints about utilities, id. §§ 1391, 1398.
15. Mrs. Jackson based her allegation of state action on the fact that Metropolitan Edison
was subject to extensive regulation by the Pennsylvania Utilities Commission, the idea that
Metropolitan Edison performed a "public function," and the theory that the state has so
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Metropolitan Edison that it was a
joint participant in the termination procedures. She also claimed that the state had approved
and authorized the termination procedures because the Pennsylvania Utilities Commission
approved the general tariff Metropolitan Edison had filed which included the right to termi-
nate services for non-payment. 95 S. Ct. at 451.
16. Mrs. Jackson claimed her right to electric service was property under the "entitlement
theory." See note 10 supra. 95 S. Ct. at 451.
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that she had failed to show the necessary state action." The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal, and the Supreme
Court affirmed. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found that the
state was not sufficiently connected with the termination to make Metro-
politan Edison's conduct attributable to the state for purposes of the four-
teenth amendment.5
In the early fifties,"9 the Supreme Court developed the theory that exten-
sive governmental regulation could convert the actions of a private entity
into state action; a theory later reinforced in the sixties." However, the
correlation between state regulation and state action became questionable
after Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis," in which the Court indicated that the
mere existence of state regulation by itself would no longer justify a finding
of state action.2
In Jackson the Court adopted a restrictive theory of state action, holding
that the mere fact that a business is subject to extensive and detailed state
regulation does not by itself convert the acts of the business into those of
the state for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.2' This new, more rigid
standard of state action requires that the state directly encourage or foster
the challenged action by ordering it, rather than merely approving or au-
thorizing it.u
17. The Court concluded that Mrs. Jackson did nothing more than show that Metropolitan
Edison was a heavily regulated private utility with a partial monopoly in furnishing electric
service within its territory, and that it elected to terminate its services in a manner permitted
under Pennsylvania law. Id. at 457.
18. The Court side-stepped the issue of whether electric services qualify as entitlements,
holding that since the requirement of state action had not been met, it had no occasion to
decide the entitlement issue. Id.
19. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). A privately owned and operated
bus company, Capital Transit, was subject to close regulatory supervision by the Public
Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia. The Court found that such regulation and
supervision converted the bus company's interests into state action. Id. at 462.
20. Evans. v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) (extensive governmental surveillance of a
private utility could provide the basis for a finding of state action).
21. 407 U.S. 163 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Moose Lodge]. A black guest at a private club
was refused service because of his race. The guest claimed such discriminatory action violated
his constitutional rights under § 1983, and that state action existed because the club had been
granted a liquor license by the state. The Court held that the general regulatory requirements
imposed by the state did not sufficiently involve the state in the club's activities to justify a
finding of state action.
While it is possible to distinguish Pollak from Moose Lodge on the facts because the
regulation in Moose Lodge was not as pervasive as that in Pollak, the Court's language in
Moose Lodge seemed to place severe limitations on Pollak.
22. Id. at 175-76.
23. 95 S. Ct. at 453.
24. In Jackson the Court declared that approval by a state utility commission of the actions
19751
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Until the Jackson decision the Supreme Court had consistently indi-
cated that the presence of a governmentally conferred monopoly was a
weighty factor in determining whether constitutional obligations could be
imposed on private entities.25 In assessing the role a state granted or pro-
tected monopoly plays, the Court now found it not to be a determining
factor in considering whether Metropolitan Edison's termination proce-
dure was state action.26 Instead it relied upon Public Utility Commission
v. Pollak, in which it expressly disclaimed reliance on the monopoly factor
for finding state action." It is submitted that Pollak, upon a careful read-
ing, will not hold up as precedent for this decision. The Pollak decision on
its face simply states that the monopoly factor was not used as an element
in finding state action in that case, not that the presence of a monopoly is
never relevant in determining state action.2 8
Traditionally when the Court has based a finding of state action on the
"public function"2 theory, it has used a narrow definition of what consti-
of a public utility "where the Commission has not put its own weight on the side of the
proposed action by ordering it, does not transmute a practice initiated by the utility and
approved by the Commission into 'state action'." 95 S. Ct. at 456-67.
25. Railway Employees v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (government conferral of monopoly
status and the right to be the exclusive bargaining agent for certain classes of railroad em-
ployees); Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 322 U.S. 722 (1944) (government-conferred monopoly
status to be the exclusive bargaining agent for certain classes of railroad employees).
The Court in Moose Lodge emphasized that the state's liquor licensing scheme did not
confer a monopoly on the private club, thus implying that if a monopoly had been present, a
finding of state action would have been justified. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
176-77 (1972).
26. 95 S. Ct. at 454. As a factual matter the Court felt that it was doubtful that the state
ever granted or guaranteed Metropolitan Edison Company a monopoly. The Court pointed
out that there was nothing in Metropolitan Edison's certificate of public convenience or the
Pennsylvania statutes under which the certificate was granted, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, §§
1121-23, that indicated that the state granted or guaranteed monopoly status to Metropoli-
tan. The Court concluded, however, that the existence or non-existence of the monopoly
would not have made any difference in their decision. 95 S. Ct. at 454.
27. Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952).
28. 95 S. Ct. at 458 n.4 (Justice Douglas dissenting). See also id. at 461 (Justice Marshall
dissenting). Justice Marshall suggests that the majority distinguishes the prior decisions from
the decision in Jackson on the assertion that utility companies are "natural monopolies"
rather than "artificial monopolies." Id. at 461 n.8. The majority theory seems to be that the
state's purpose in regulating a natural monopoly is to prevent the charging of monopoly
prices, not to prevent competition, thus making the state's involvement less significant. This
seems to be a rather narrow distinction, especially in view of the fact that state grants of the
monopoly status to public utilities have enabled them to successfully defend antitrust suits
by arguing that their acts are state actions, and therefore, exempt from antitrust laws. See,
e.g., Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971). It seems illogical to
allow utilities to plead state action as a defense in some situations and to deny it in others.
29. See note 11 supra.
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tutes a "public function," finding the presence of state action only when a
private entity exercises power usually reserved exclusively to the state.30
In Jackson the Court held the "public function" did not justify a finding
of state action, because Pennsylvania law never required the state to fur-
nish utility services to its citizens.31 Therefore Metropolitan Edison was
exercising a power not traditionally associated with the state.2
The Court rejected the idea that the state was a "joint participant" in
Metropolitan Edison's termination procedures. In Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority,34 the Court found joint participation, and consequently
state action, in the fact that the state had insinuated itself into a position
of interdependence with a lessee of state property. The Court found that
Jackson lacked this symbiotic relationship since Metropolitan Edison was
a privately owned and operated utility that did not lease its facilities from
the state.3 5 The only relationship the Court found between Metropolitan
Edison and the state was the extensive state regulation.36
While the Court pays lip service to the theory that consideration of the
totality of the circumstances surrounding a state's involvement is neces-
sary to determine the existence of state action, 7 the majority seem to take
30. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1931).
31. The Court found that the furnishing of utility service had never been, under Pennsyl-
vania law, either a state function or a municipal duty. 95 S. Ct. at 454. See Baily v. Philadel-
phia, 184 Pa. 594, 39 A. 494 (1898); Girard Life Ins. Co. v. City of Philadelphia, 80 Pa. 393
(1879). Pennsylvania law, PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 66, § 1171 (1959), requires state regulated
utilities to supply continuous utility services, but imposes no such obligation on the state. 95
S. Ct. at 454.
32. The Court refused to expand the "public function" theory into the broad premise that
all businesses providing essential goods and services "are state actors in all their activities."
95 S. Ct. at 455.
The Court followed its decision in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) where it refused
to accept "affected with a public interest" as a valid test in defining state action. Id. at 536.
33. 95 S. Ct. at 457.
34. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). A private individual operated a restaurant in space leased from a
state parking authority in a publicly owned building. This individual refused to let blacks
eat in his restaurant. The Court found that his landlord-tenant relationship with the state
caused his otherwise private activity to become state action. In its decision, the Court made
it clear that while "a multitude of relationships might appear to some to fall within the
Amendment's embrace. .. " the actual holding was limited to lessees of public property. Id.
at 726.
35. 95 S. Ct. at 457.
36. In Moose Lodge the Court stated that "however detailed this type of regulation may
be in some particulars, it cannot be said ... to make the State in any realistic sense a partner
or even a joint venturer. . . ." Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77 (1972).
37. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722-26 (1961).
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a sequential rather than a cumulative approach." It is submitted that it
is not enough to examine each of the factors upon which a claimant re-
lies,39 and dismiss each one individually as insufficient by itself to support
a finding of state action. To determine a state's true involvement with a
private entity, the aggregate of the facts must control.
Though state action may now be more clearly defined, the Jackson deci-
sion tends to leave utility customers without recourse against high-handed
utility practices. The Court seems to pass over the facts that utility serv-
ices are vital to the public, that competition between utilities is usually
non-existent, and that states endow utilities with rights and powers greater
than those enjoyed by other private companies. Because utility consumers
have no other source from which to obtain these essential services, utility
companies have little incentive to deal fairly with their customers."0
However, the consequences of this decision extend far beyond an unwill-
ingness to expand fourteenth amendment procedural due process to pri-
vately owned utilities. The new, more restrictive standard of state action,
and the refusal to expand the public function or joint participant theories,
place a seemingly insurmountable burden upon plaintiffs seeking to prove
state action under § 1983. Moreover, the failure to follow a cumulative
approach in its analysis of state action permits the Court to pass over the
true extent of a state's involvement with a private entity. If a majority of
the Supreme Court continues to adhere to these guidelines, rarely will a
plaintiff be able to satisfy the "state action" requirement of § 1983.
W. C. E. III
38. See 95 S. Ct. at 453-54.
39. Such an approach does not seem to focus on the true extent of the state's relationship
with Metropolitan Edison. When the aggregate of all the facts is considered, it shows a
monopolistic utility which provides essential public services as a licensee of the state, and
this is done within a framework of extensive state supervision and control. The challenged
procedures of Metropolitan Edison were approved by the state and were made enforceable
by the weight and authority of the state. The state also has the power to review and amend
Metropolitan Edison's regulation if the public interest so requires. The totality of the circum-
stances seems to show that the state is extremely intertwined with Metropolitan Edison's
actions and has sufficiently authorized and supported its termination procedures to justify a
finding of state action. See Mr. Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion, 95 S. Ct. at 459.
40. Comment, Constitutional Safeguards for Public Utility Customers: Power To The
People, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 493 (1973).
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